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The Journal of Dialogue Studies is a multidisciplinary, peer-reviewed academic journal published twice a year. Its aim is to study the theory and practice of dialogue, understood provisionally as: meaningful interaction and exchange between people (often of different social, cultural, political, religious or professional groups) who come together through various kinds of conversations or activities with a view to increased understanding. The Journal is published by the Institute for Dialogue Studies, the academic platform of the Dialogue Society.

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The turn to populism in Western governments is increasingly marked by a breakdown in communication between those who disagree. Martin Buber’s analysis of I-It as the nature of communication accounts for the impersonality and incivility of populist responses to globalisation. His writings on utopias account for the lack of centre in societies formed solely around bureaucratic means of production. This article elaborates upon his concept of I-It from *I and Thou* and his account of the breakdown of Marxism. These point to a loss of *Thou* as a binding and guiding force in community, leading to the uncivil distrust and populist reactions to globalisation. Neoliberal globalisation, as with the I-It interaction, is marked by a disconnection from nature in a system that is centred around self-interest. Buber theorised his *Thou* as the place where humanity is reconnected with nature and joined to others in dialogue. His work points to religious community as one witness to communities where forms of dialogue and interaction lie beyond market-based solution creation and negotiation. In Buber’s work, a diagnosis for the anger and mistrust between neighbours and citizens in the present moment becomes salient: a disconnection from Thou as the organizing centre of community.

Keywords: Martin Buber, Economics, Utopias, Neoliberalism, Communication ethics, Globalisation

**Introduction**

In this article, I expand a suggestion made by Ronald C. Arnett that the individualistic self may be rooted in capitalism. In *Communication and Community: Implications of Martin Buber’s Dialogue*, he posits that those who travel and experience the world as capitalists accumulate encounters with others; accumulation is presumed to be the source of happiness (Arnett 1986, 76). This assertion highlights the purpose of communication with others as partially definitive of that experience, as seen with Aristotle’s final cause. I extend this conversation through this essay, understanding Martin Buber’s analysis of economic transactions through his philosophical anthropology and his support of a form of socialism that emerges from analysis of pre-Marxist accounts of ‘Utopia.’ The essay examines the economic transaction of I-It, a designation for human relation that inescapably undergirds society in the
historical moment of Buber: early twentieth-century Europe. His work addresses the post-World War I existentialist dilemma of the West, with socialism overtaking both the State in Stalinist Russia and the capitalist individualism against which it aimed to rebel (Baron 1996, 249–250). Buber’s analysis reveals a core dilemma in the contemporary moment; the centrality of capitalism to all human practices, its role as a system within States, and the refashioning of community beyond dialogue within it.

The extent to which capitalism is a centralised ordering system that overtakes all human endeavour, and whether it should be, are each up for debate. On one side, there are those that wish to overhaul modern capitalism. Contemporary progressives such as best-selling journalist Naomi Klein consider the separation of human production from nature, of economic pursuits and their ethical tolls on the planet and on labour (Klein 2014, 9). Klein argues that dependence on fossil fuels not only drives climate change, but it pushes Western companies to develop new markets that deal with its effects, thereby furthering the crisis and increasing the lust for oil. This in part explains the centrality of the energy extraction industry to the global economy; she dates the drive to extract fuel from the earth back to Francis Bacon and *De Augmentis Scientiarum* (1623) (Klein 2014, 170). She also notes the clashes between producers and indigenous peoples and labourers that have marked this process since its inception (Klein 2014, 175–177). Klein echoes Bernie Sanders in the 2016 US presidential election and his call for reforming capitalism (Rehmann 2016), a call which reconsiders its own premises and develops new praxis.

Ironically, the opposite position also mistrusts globalised economics that has led to populist election results in the West, including the 2016 Brexit vote and the election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States. These populist movements depicted the neoliberal globalised economy as the source of the dehumanisation of working and lower-middle classes throughout the West, marked by rumours of government funding going to illegal immigrants. Such movements are rooted in the fear of a system that would allow billionaires and government officials to undermine basic property rights, using environmental regulation to force small business owners to surrender their land to multinational corporations (Aho 2016, xi). Echoes of Ronald Reagan’s 1989 Farewell Address are seen in this rhetoric, where he famously asserted that the expansion of government meant the contraction of liberty, in an equation ‘as neat and predictable as a law of physics’ (Reagan 2004, 516). This movement in the West, however, does not conceive of problems in Western capitalism so much as a corruption of an otherwise highly beneficial system. Leaders such as Trump, who has business holdings and bank dealings throughout the world, seek not to overhaul such a system so much as to
regain Western (American) dominance within it. Forms of state communication, such as diplomacy, are re-envisioned as pure negotiation, rather than dialogue that joins two parties in conversation. Further, the confusion of rhetoric and the politically charged news media landscape lead citizens across the political spectrum to question economics and government anew, in partisan ideologies that inhibit dialogue. What emerges is artificial ideology that masks the ground of such community, which is self-interest.

Martin Buber’s anthropological philosophy stands as an important voice to address these contemporary concerns over totalised, neoclassical economic systems. These are systems that were presumed by neoliberals to provide ‘unanimity without conformity’ (Friedman 2002, 23; see also Etzioni 1988, 1), but which are experienced as total conformity. Buber’s work reminds humanity that economic I-It relations, as explained in his work I-Thou, produce power relations that are not in and of themselves to be feared, yet cannot be dualistically separated from the concerns of the social or the political. Buber’s analysis of utopias and collectives predates Marxist socialism, and, considered in light of his project of interhuman dialogue, where the Thou enters into human communication, challenges the sole propriety of I-It, noting the human call into something greater. Buber’s advocacy of community and socialism is contextualised in the face of Marxist socialism, which would assume the role of State supremacy that it had originally intended to eliminate. For Buber, however, the Thou, the spirit which guides humanity, must be the centre of community, liberating us from systems that predefine our actions and humanise human relations beyond the causality of economic communication.

A rehearsal of the nature of economics in I-Thou follows the interpretations of those such as Hoover and Lutz, who point to the relevance of Buber’s philosophical account for present crises of bureaucratic States and determinist economic systems. Buber’s work reveals the distinct nature of economic interaction that informs the neoliberal quest to make the free market the primary organising system of the globe, and the disconnection between humans in interaction with each other that results.

I-It and Economics

The I-It is a move of separation, the differentiation between subject and object in consciousness (Buber 2010, 23). It is distinct from an organic, natural connection, such as that between a child and its bodily interactions with its mother, which flow continually in unification inside the womb (25). The Thou-ness of a child is ‘inborn’ (27). Its connection forms it into an I as it emerges into the world (29) and, from here, it can relate as I-It to ‘an object of perception and experience without real connexion [sic]’ (29). In It-ness, humans observe others and perceive, recalling their Thou-ness, to which they reconnect (30). I-It relates to science and the mechanisms
of the world that sustain humanity, yet it is not I-Thou (32). I-It exists in space and time, awaiting transformation into Thou-ness (34); the instrumental experience becomes the first step to unify into the Thou.

Here, then, the I-It relation describes a typical plan for aggregate, capitalist community that, in Thou-ness, progresses further in connection. I-It involves experiencing another (It) as she or he appears to an I in an instrumental way; their instrumentation is a part of life (38) – this is not understood in the manner of Heidegger’s Sein (Even-Chen and Meir 2012, 33; Buber 2002, xv). The I begins with the internal feeling that protects I from the institutions of the world, which appear to I as It (Buber 2010, 43). Buber does not allow that this is an unethical stance toward the world, so long as the It does not overtake the I (46). The I is uneasy in its division with It, but this relation begins the process of community, of the pre-natal reunification into Thou. The Thou is a ‘Third’ presence that is ‘received in the present’ (46).

This marks economic exchanges as prior to deeper forms of dialogue and exchange, rooted in the Thou, the reconnection to others. In this understanding, Buber questions the absence of Thou-ness from capitalism: ‘Can the two compartments of this life, economics and State, with their present extent and completeness of structure, be conceived to rest on any other basis but that of a deliberate renunciation of all “directness,” and a resolute rejection of every court of appeal which is “alien,” that is, which does not arise from this sphere itself?’ (47) Buber notes the presumption of distance from others that has been assumed to be the foundation of capitalist economic activity in the West since Adam Smith, who argued that distanced bargaining is natural to humanity to acquire goods (Smith 2003, ch. 2). Buber’s question identifies the permanence of objectification in the economic exchange, the separation between humans in transaction. Yet he is clear that this separation alone should not be understood as evil, echoing the natural state of humanity from Smith: ‘Man’s will to profit and to be powerful have their natural and proper effect so long as they are linked with, and upheld by, his will to enter into relation. There is no evil impulse till the impulse has been separated from the being’ (Buber 2010, 48). Here, Buber addresses his contemporary socialists, who aimed to undermine State and Capitalist structures as oppressive to human community. Rather, both State and Economic spheres, around which power circulates, are not problematic in and of themselves, so long as they are joined to a ‘spirit’ (49). Dismantling them from the edges of society is no ‘substitute for the living relation with the Centre’ (49). Financial systems allow humans the resources to enter into relations that determine and facilitate a Thou relation, when ‘spirit’ is made centre of that community.

It is the person of character who bears responsibility for interpersonal exchanges in
the economic sphere of the I-It. Attention to one’s disposition is not the sign of a ‘dilettante’ or perhaps a ‘sucker’ in more contemporary language, who thinks that all exchanges should involve interpersonal connection and Thou-ness. Rather, this spirit brings meaning to work and labour that one provides to sustain the system, and only such spirit overcomes Marxist alienation, where workers are commodities that produce other commodities (Marx, 1844, 29). Community is reified through human I-It relations, but it is ultimately birthed prior to State and Economic systems as Thou; only such an account of State and Economics liberates people, which is the role of the Thou (Buber 2010, 50).

This community, in which Thou is the centre, is not dualistic in a separation of It and Thou. While public and private spheres provide some separation between the personal and the economic, this does not disconnect all It-ness to public and all Thou-ness to private. The It and Thou are fluid in their motion as people relate to others around them. Such fluidity is dualistic if understood to be separated into spheres and would allow It to rise to ‘tyranny’ and ‘rob the spirit completely of reality’ (50). Instead, the spirit draws power from the world of It. Spirituality of Buber’s time aims to reclaim this reality (51).

This perceived split is due in part to the constraints of It relations. Bound to space and time, the I-It is bound to the causality of the scientific world, to the systems and rules that govern behaviour (51). It is the approach to the Thou that allows freedom for the agent to choose beyond determinism. This removes the fear of the necessary, the systemic constraints, as the glimpse of the Thou has overcome him (52–53). It is what gives the human the courage to face the I-It world, which often overwhelms (54), which is bogged down in the ‘dogma of process’ that ‘leaves no room for freedom’ (57). Escaping causality means escaping fate that seems inescapable (56). Belief in fate in its own sake, however, is a mistake for Buber (Friedman 1983, 57). The inevitable telos, the end of the system that resolves as it must in scientific certainty, felt inescapable in the early twentieth-century context of Europe, from the dread of the existentialist and technological critic (52) to the persecuted Jewry of Eastern Europe and the Statist Russians. The Thou is what allows us to escape the notion that freedom does not exist (Buber 2010, 58).

Buber does not tread lightly in his assertions; like his existentialist contemporaries, he wonders how the power of I, as subject, has been ‘ruined’ and ‘trampled’ and can rise again (58). As self-will and fate, marks of the economic, Statist I-It relation, combat one another, it is the Thou that breaks in to give a glimpse beyond determinism (59). Thou-ness moves us to meet with destiny, unsure of what that is (60); this forms the freedom of the I. This hope moves beyond the systems that have oppressed, ironically so, in the post-utopian context of the early twentieth century.
Contemporary issues emerge through the I-It discussion that inform economic debates. First, Buber's I-It accounts for a separation from nature with the ruling Thou facilitating a return. The economic separation that allows domination of nature, that requires sustainability experts integrating ecological endeavours into business, for example, to persuade business leaders that such activity adds value before it can be adopted, rather than business leaders acting in an encounter of Thou-ness, is understood through the I-It. Second, the separation of the I and It reflects the Marxist alienation of labour, a concern of Buber in the need for Thou to infuse working relations between human beings (Buber 2002, 42–43). This transformation, and the ability of the Thou to disrupt process, leads to a third area of concern, which is the recovery of humanity in the face of economic determinism, in the transformation of the public sphere to quarantine encounters with Thou as, at best, a strategic option, and not a call. The emergent issues in market economics are the ability to control fate, to control outcome, to reveal and control causality in the attribution of exchange value, often through negotiation. Dobrijevic, Stanisic, and Masic, in their discussion of the role of perception in negotiation, provide a typical account of power in economic interaction: 'All negotiators want power, they know what they can do by putting pressure to the other side... When a negotiator thinks he has less power than the other party, he/she believes that the other side already possesses some advantage that can be used and consequently starts looking for more power in order to neutralise the other party's power' (2011, 36). They explore multiple accounts of how power is harnessed, but each toward a shared telos: a favourable outcome. Economics and It encounters allow relations to be reduced to negotiation, rather than allowing a Thou to control and connect and reunify. Reconnection with Thou as the birthing source of community, of human interaction, allows us to interact with such systems and not to lose the anthropological centre of our identity, to trivialise our existence to mere biology and sensory cause/effect relation. It, rather, creates, to borrow from Buber's critique of Oswald Spengler, 'that which constitutes the category of man' (Buber 2002, 85), and does not separate from Thou.

Buber's analysis of the initial period that led to the rise of socialism and the formation of utopias, prior to World War II, discerns differences in economic systems that inform modern responses to the reduction of economics to the I-It. His account of community through co-operative structures reveals further the strategies that attempted (and failed) to overcome the alienation between the self and nature and others. His work uses the Thou, the spirit of humanity, to reclaim and protect institutions (Buber 1952, xv). Buber would turn to religious understanding to overcome these issues, attempts that would manifest in later forms in Israeli co-operatives and the kibbutz.
Communities and Utopia

Utopias were conceived as the final escape from the oppressive system of labour and production, where division of labour that inhibits meaning in life is recovered. This produced two accounts of socialist response, which Buber approaches throughout his writing. One is rooted in imminence and the other in the transcendent Thou. As socialism aimed for the most just State or community, with the Hegelian dialectic within imminent humanity revealing this process as adapted by Marx, Buber turns to economics as eschatological, which reveals in space and time from beyond it—in line with creation, not alienated from it. Such contexts overcome the aimlessness or lack of agency in humans, who, in dehumanising systems, existed like ‘a stick stuck in a bundle moving through the water, abandoned to the current or being pushed by a pole from the bank in this or that direction’ (Buber 2002, 74). This is a particular mark of the technological era, which, since the Enlightenment, viewed humanity as able to solve its own problems, its own dilemmas, not to seek guidance from above (Buber 1952, 8). Buber’s work examines both.

Buber examines community and society. Drawing from Tönnies, Buber considers the divide between a functional community focused on a centre of good (Gemeinschaft) and one rooted in disconnection (Gesellschaft) (xvi). The former develops as a response to the loneliness of the technological age (14), a space of fellowship, though in a contemporary context; Buber does not aim for nostalgia in community (15). Rather, it is infused with Thou-ness, with spirit. That which bonds the community matters deeply. He would call for economic community bonded not by religious dogma, but rather ‘religious exaltation,’ one conditioned by insight into the factors of life that must be considered anew (72). Each group of people in a community, then, is labelled ‘society,’ which precedes State. Further, each of these societies must consider its values. Buber’s work aims for a philosophical account of sociology, or one that is not ‘value-free’ (Lutz 1996, 268). For Buber, society is ‘a living and life-giving collaboration, an essentially autonomous consociation of human beings, shaping and re-shaping itself from within’ (Buber 1952, 14). Its structures are units, not individuals; the elimination of these unit structures through capitalist economy, which initiated societal progress ‘as a process of atomization’ (14), formed the historical basis for the work of the nineteenth-century utopians. Buber identifies three basic accounts of utopian society that counter this process. Each differs in two particular and significant ways for Buber: the organising Thou of the community and its telos of activity.

The first form of utopian society is consumer co-operative, rooted in an account of community where Thou-ness was irrelevant. Harmony, Indiana, the establishment of Robert Owen, was a settlement based upon such shared consumption, in an
attempt to abandon dogma. Buber argues that Owen’s utopia failed because there was no replacement narrative or other structures to unite it (75). He critiques consumption as a specific bond of community, noting that it asks little of those involved in community or society and shifts responsibility within a community to managers, not offering any sense of unity (77). The manager then transforms the community into a group of people who she or he attempts to have work for her or him. In terms of society as an organism that works together, ones with only minimal encounter or unifying interactive practices do not evolve into a ‘true social organism’ (77–78). This transformation is limited in ‘a technical and managerial sense’ (78). The organising Thou, then, is community practice and the predetermined telos is mere production.

The producer co-operative is the second form of utopia, which was privileged in Karl Marx’s account of society. This involved the working class becoming the leadership of society. This would require a revolution, however, and one that wholly replaces the social with the political (83). The co-operative was to be spread nationally, even given the risk of devolvement of such co-operatives ‘into ordinary bourgeois joint-stock companies’ (85); redistribution of wealth was meant to remedy this temptation. In differentiation from other forms of socialism, the federalisation of such co-operatives is Marx’s communism (87); they could not remain isolated from the influence of each other.

Marx’s concern for revolution in this account, however, eschewed the social almost entirely. Buber notes that despite the efforts to unite the proletariat, these were political and economic in nature, not social: ‘the evolution of the new social form…was neither the real object of its thought nor the real goal of its action’ (98). The action in these communities has no ‘clear and consistent frame of reference’ (99). The political restructuring would evolve through Leninism and the Russian Revolution, which despite hatred of bureaucracy (116), managed to evolve into one. This became the re-animalisation of humanity, the reduction to zoological function (130). Hannah Arendt later echoed this critique of a labouring society, one where production is its unifying component, without a sense of the transcendent, as a means of survival. Yet ‘without being at home in the midst of things whose durability makes them fit for use and for erecting a world whose very permanence stands in direct contrast to life, this life would never be human’ (Arendt 1998, 135). This speaks to a society lacking a Thou that is only in solidarity through the State divorced from a ‘society,’ which is ironically abolished. The protection of this structure, separate from other communities, is its telos (as was later the case in East Germany, for example). Such a society is part of Modernity, which views others as ‘a cog in the “collective” machine’ (Buber 1952, 132). Ironically, communal or social identity overtakes that of the individual in the totalisation that co-operatives
sought to avoid; Proudhon, another early socialist, saw the communist collective as ‘ruthless perfection’ (30). In communism, humans run to ‘the great collectivities’ (132) in the absence of such original community emerging from a Thou. This form of modern life offers the telos of false community, which appears true in the distorted and unrelenting push of technology, ‘causing [one] to lose the feel of community—just when [one] is so full of the illusion of living in perfect devotion to [one’s] community’ (132).

The re-imagining of society, then, can only happen through ‘full co-operatives,’ which are the third account examined by Buber. These are marked by a ‘union of producers and consumers…a union whose power and vitality for socialism can only be guaranteed’ by all co-operatives working together (79). The nature of these, however, cannot be mere aggregate societies. There must be ‘little societies’ that associate with others on the basis of ‘the social principle – the principle of inner cohesion, collaboration, and mutual stimulation’ (80). From this emerges the proper socialist State. Such a State overcomes the failure of the co-operative through isolation, which Kropotkin noted (74). Buber draws this understanding of social association in the earliest account of ‘socialism’ from Pierre Leroux in 1848, who noted that ‘if you have no will for human association, I tell you that you are exposing civilization to the fate of dying in fearful agony’ (128). Leroux, following the work of Saint-Simon, was an influential reformer who attempted to popularise social change in the name of the Church in nineteenth-century France (Bakunin 1975, 58). The unity of these co-operatives separates them from the other two accounts. Buber’s accounts of Christian Socialism within France and England point to spiritual organisation to recover the lost sense of community within socialism.

Buber’s account affirms the role of community in identity beyond the self. He specifically notes that community must be integrated with people working together as well as ‘their mutual relationships’ (Buber 1952, 134; emphasis added). The extension of I-It is merely a beginning to such bonds. Social life cannot be maintained if aggregate limitation, to protect an economic system, defines these interactions. The organising Thou and the telos are revealed as on-going, not mired in attention to and obsession with causality in social exchange that honours the laws of dialectical materialism or the neoliberal market, which Buber argues forms belief in ‘fate’ (Friedman 1983, 66). This belief in the telos of ‘fate’ is reflective of the ‘self-willed man’ who is defined by his own actions and never sacrifices. Disunion rules his world, however, as his means and end as an agent are always separated through his own agency as an ‘originative “I”’ (Arnett 2013, 8); an identity that starts with the Self rather than a community. Such a person has no use for what is exterior; he thinks he is satisfied by I-It relations. Here, then, we see individualism tied to a particular account of economic systemisation that eschews community
and society.

Yet Buber’s work also critiques the development of self-righteous behaviour within a unit that leads to the atomistic separation from others, as well as the assumption of defined telos that characterises individualism. Religious communities, for example, are defined by a dogma that, as a system, functions similarly to capitalism as an once-revealed, telos-defined set of functions accounting for right and wrong in rigid terms. For Buber, attachment to dogma mirrors the Statist rule of law too closely and leads to self-righteous attention to one’s own behaviour in a community (Buber 1952, 72). Buber examines the movement of co-operative development in France and England that led to the formation of Marxist doctrine, discerning which communities worked and which could work. Those rooted purely in economic or Statist law were termed ‘schematic fiction,’ an idealised, ahistorical form of community imposed from above (11). Then there were those that involved ‘organic planning,’ which did not anticipate outcome but point in a just direction. Buber argues that the West, since Plato, has attempted to reify ideals with tools, but argues that planning and experimentation in social life are more recent. In these cases, it is the orientation, the Thou that reconnects one to another, in its own social nature. Communities that lack this account will falter.

**A Distinctively Spiritual Turn**

Community, then, is not just rooted in the State, or a State that operates as an industrial machine; it also nurtures as a mother (39). These relations happen in the between space, which is the only place where a ‘spirit of solidarity can…remain alive’ (65). As Maurice Friedman has noted in his extension and interpretation of Buber’s work, the between is the location of true community (Friedman 1983, 38; Friedman 1960, 43). As I and Thou affirms, the intentional retreat from Thou is dehumanisation. Importantly this between is not just held between people, as utopian Fourier advocated in his ‘universal harmony’ (Buber 1952 20), but also between communities.

The Thou of the community, which Buber develops in later writing and work on the development of the State of Israel, is evidence of religious socialism. Such communities emerge from ‘the spirit working silently in the depths’ (Friedman 1960, 47). They are alternatives both to the communist and the neoliberal state, each of which suppresses the good. As Maurice Friedman argues

*Both [capitalist and socialist states] are evil in so far as they prevent the springing-up of the good, the socialist state in that it makes impossible even those remnants of true community which exist in the capitalist state, the capitalist state in that the relations between man and man are indirect and*
perverted, based on desire for exploitation rather than true togetherness. (47)

Community only emerges from the shared orientation to an ‘Eternal Thou’ (64); the reunification of I and It (67).

These accounts of community have been controversial in the West as religious communities have separated themselves from the famously atheist Marx, distrustful of the misuse of power. In a Western post-Cold War context, words like ‘socialism’ sear into the psyche as a trigger for oppression of liberty and State surveillance. Those who espouse socialism in the positive often connect to critical theoretical examinations, and often join with other descriptors such as ‘liberal’ or ‘radical’ (Carey 2014). Yet as Buber’s account of community shows, this Western divide may only be rhetorical. Though resistance to Thou–connected communities still emerges when framed as communism or socialism, the West seeks community that eschews the mechanical of the Industrialist Communist State, and its surveillance and environmental degradation.

Religious communities in the West have developed this conversation for several years. Pope John Paul II, for one, was an early voice offering critical analysis of neoliberalism, calling the globalised economy a system that must be subject to ethical consideration. He offered moral theological reflections on a system that ironically promises greater liberty but avoids understanding human qualities of life (Himes 2008, 272). Re-examination of the ‘dignity of work’ in the Catholic Social Teaching tradition also re-emerges (Sison, Ferrero, and Guitián 2016) as part of an on-going Vatican examination of globalised economics and its effects on human worth of workers and precariats, a view that is shared by Pope Francis III (Gregg 2017, 366); this can be at least dated back to *Rerum Novarum* in 1892, and is extended by groups such as the National Catholic Rural Life Conference (NCRLC) (Bovée 2016). While not atheist and not driven by an ultimate authority of the State (though the Vatican does have Statehood), concerns for all components of community are shown by the Church in a mirror of early Marxist critiques. Its attention to Thou counteracts the understood rigidity of neoliberalism.

**Capitalism Rethought through the I-It**

Writers on capitalism have not ignored the role of community, though the totalisation of separation of It-ness and Thou-ness in capitalism suggests that such roles have been underthought. Catholic intellectuals analysing the history of work for its own sake in the West, emerging from Max Weber’s analysis, argue that the West rose when religious ideals were embodied in community practices. Francis Fukuyama, for example, drawing from the Greek *thymos*, allows that pre-Modern practices should infuse and direct community to make liberal capitalism work;
he calls for capitalism to adopt them (Fukuyama 2006, 227–233). This stands in the clear lineage of Weber, who argued for the link between Protestantism and success as a leader in industry (Weber 2001). Yet such writing ignores the totality of neoliberalism and of the globalisation project, which redefined justice and community. Such redefinition excludes shared faith in God, or even basic trust as a unifying principle of diverse persons, an argument made by Jane Jacobs in her defence of twentieth-century cities (Jacobs 1961).

Neoliberalism minimises the I-It relation to a single point between with two sides divided in transaction, rather than brought together in the unity of genuine personal exchanges. Globalised neoliberalism reifies all justice as distributive and locates the *telos* of human activity in self-interest. Activity within capitalism reveals what is the true market price and directs our behaviour. As Foucault argues, capitalism marked the turn from jurisdiction to veridiction (Foucault 2008, 31–32). Foucault’s work reveals that exchange value is the *Thou* of liberal capitalism; furthermore, its violation, specifically through State interventions into economic practices which distort exchange value, is injustice that corrupts the system. The system only works when this condition is met. The absence of State intervention, as a response to World War II, drove the neoliberal project—such a system seems appealing as a response to State brutality. Communism was understood to be a totalising system of power that disallows control, one that was revealed, in a scientific manner through evidence of its failure, always to falter. Its *telos* was future harmony, even if it was after a revolution. This has been noted long since before the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Hayek notes the ‘shaken’ communists who had to admit that Marxism led to Stalin’s tyranny (Hayek 2007, 79). Quoting Walter Lippmann, Hayek argues that submission to a system of one’s own affairs leads to tyranny (80). Though a preface to the 1976 edition of his text asserts that he never said all socialism leads to totalitarianism (55), this theme has been adopted by his intellectual progeny: economic ‘freedom’ checks State power (Friedman 2002, 11). But in this account, the social is completely absent as an externality, as, accordingly, is social justice. Justice is only understood in terms of distribution within the system.

The principles of globalisation, ironically conceived to counter another system, communism, both of which were meant to counter the religious and totalitarian taxation and rules of the Church and State in the Enlightenment era, demand immediate, clear results to dialogue. Globalisation envisions exchanges as negotiated dialectic, with revelations limited to the weakness and strength of the other, or the exchange value that guides their interactions (see Friedman and Friedman 1980, 18–20; Friedman 1961, 75–77). Such interactions are not guided by a *Thou*. That which guides us, revealed by the *Thou*, is elusive; it ‘happens,’ as we receive ‘not a specific “content” but a Presence, a Presence as power’ (Buber
Globalisation as an economic system, emerging from the free market, renders human communication in legal speak rooted in predictability—there must be certainty in contracts, and in agreements, which are the only ‘between’ of globalisation. The reification of the transcendent, through the uplifting of science and math as systems with eternal rules that are more certain, more fair than rhetorical or religious narratives, marks the ascendency of economic systems as controlling of human behaviour, confusing accounts of power.*

Not all capitalism is neoliberal, of course. Excellence in productivity is a primary virtue that often serves as a rebuttal to critiques of the system, rooted in the Nietzschean critique of morality that corrupts excellence in its practice (Nietzsche 2007). For him, only individual will to power can achieve the heights of humanity and social commitment to a community-centred Thou abolishes this process. Accounts of the twenty-four-hour-a-day work of the globalised marketplace, combined with earlier Weberian accounts of the Protestant Ethic, suggest that the drive of industrial production allows us to escape the brutality of the totalitarian socialist regime through the accumulation of goods that make individuals less dependent on the State. Doubtless, this is a motivation to reframe justice as distributive rather than jurisdictional. Yet Buber’s work points to the key problem of modern and post-modern individualism. The alienation from others feels persistent and the most capitalist-driven, most liberated market activity in human history has not led to innovative solutions for loneliness. Meaningful interactions with others, which is a primary driving force behind dialogue (Kelly 2013, 52), diminish in the face of the pursuit of our self-interest. Problems made salient by current political controversies over immigration and global markets only show that communication centred solely on a telos, the attainment of that which interests us, forms communities that transform what is Thou from a Spirit, a force, or a phenomenon, into a system.

Buber’s work suggests that Full Co-Operative units, based in local community that correspond with other communities, embody the petite narratives of postmodernity that connect us and eschew the universal, leading to Thou-led community with practices that reunify us with It. Reflecting on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Ronald C. Arnett notes that Levinas finds justice with ‘narratives of institutions,’ and these are disrupted by the Other, in the exchange, in the between (Arnett 2017, 152). The Thou that directs such communities emerges in multiple, petite forms (Arnett, Arneson, and Bell 2007, 163) resembling the small units that form the Buberian account of Full Co-Operative as a vision. Disillusionment with global markets, such as critiques of the corporatisation of farming (Bovée 2016, 783), has led a call for new accounts of economics, ones which may require overcoming the rhetorical baggage of ‘socialist,’ a move that millions of Bernie Sanders supporters

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* Stanley Deetz has argued forcefully for this replacement (1992).
were willing to make in the 2016 US presidential election.

Hoover and Lutz have, respectively, explored how Buber’s work extends into economic thought. Hoover notes the exploitation of environmental resources in globalisation and the call of Buber for humanity to reorient itself to nature. The It of economics currently ‘considers the planet Earth to be a bundle of resources which needs only to be exploited for the maintenance of high throughput in a high-consumption society’ (Hoover 1996, 260).** As with the rhetoric of globalisation, such a stance forgets the limits of time (261) and space that define community, and that Thou is the source of transcendence in such a world. The will to profit within the system only breaks the rules, it does not transcend them. Nor does it lead to any kind of socially legitimate community: ‘the measure of community is in the relationships which build the everyday tissues of common concern, mutual assistance, and meaningful living’ (262). Accounts of sustainability, rooted in ‘moral sustainability,’ require attention to the between, to the interhuman (265). Lutz also notes the irresistible capitalist urge to maximise production (Lutz 1996, 270), counter to the Weberian presumption of Fukuyama that a liberal capitalism needs some religious influence to persist well. This reflects liberal Christian Realism and the dualistic split of narrative and ethic critiqued by Mennonite John Howard Yoder, who sees such dualism only as an excuse to permit violence (Yoder 1994, 158). Restated, the privatisation of spiritual influence allows one to participate in a system that dominates and advances Western empire. Buber notes that the Thou does not create tension between activity in the world and religious belief, but a call to duty in the between space: ‘there is no more tension between the world and God, but only the one reality’ (Buber 2010, 108). Buber resists the ‘rational economic man’ of nineteenth-century utilitarians (269), a concept reflective of the turn to the self that contributes to accounts of libertarian individualism,*** extended to Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’: it is an impersonal force that snuffs the true spirit (274). The intimacy of the Thou reminds us that society and its normative principles and practices are revealed, mysteriously, in the connections between others; it is not violated or inhibited by those connections.

Ultimately, the social as a utopic realm has the capacity to overcome the economic alienation of humanity in all senses. The fear of globalisation, of a world that

** This is ironically rooted, in part, in a religious dominionist view of cultural activity in the West, found in the cultural mandate of Genesis 1 and expanded, as Klein argues, by Francis Bacon and beyond.

*** Libertarianism appears to develop in the mid-nineteenth century with John Stuart Mill, but is echoed in the private exchanges between economic traders that date back for centuries in Western Europe.
is not yet post-nuclear, causes humanity to question the role of the State, the social, and the nature of individual relations that emerge from it. Buber’s work points to a model that does not reify a telos, as with Marxist socialism that leads to inevitable Statism, a model that takes direction from a revealed yet unreified Thou, and points to community and space for dialogue beyond the individualism of Western economics. Ironically, the fear of socialist society, where the rule of law was a ‘weapon’ to brutalise peoples, is embodied in neoliberal society under the rule of capital and contract, whose allegiance to systemic ‘laws’ requires us to question the right of children to access food, healthcare, and quality education because the government must not intrude on private industry as a principle. Our faith in this form of capitalism calls us to avoid dialogue with others—consider those who disengage from the political realm entirely in favour of the capitalist, the consumptive, or the academic. Dialogue in Buber’s work is not marked by the avoidance of exercising power, which Arnett argues is a mark of individualism (Arnett 1986, 143). Buber’s call for the restoration of a Thou in an alienated world could not be more prescient toward overcoming cultural and social division. Neoliberalism as the source of revelation offends transcendent religious community, which still works to witness to social patterns guided by the between space of I and Thou beyond mere interactions that support production.
Bibliography


Winnicott’s Infant-caregiver Dynamic as a Bridge between Pentecostalism and Sufism

Preston Evangelou

This paper attempts to demonstrate how the Winnicottian concept of transitional progression might serve to explain similarities between Pentecostalism and Sufism by analogy of the infant-caregiver dynamic. Therefore, it is necessary to explain how maternal attunement to the infant’s biological needs support the infant’s development of a moral sense of awareness. The concept of the caregiver is a significant factor that convenes transitional progression by the practice of interplay. Hence, this method of transitional progression, according to the caregiver’s presence, is analogous to the practice of Pentecostalism and Sufism. Both denominations promote the internal regulation of ethical orientation by adhering to a care-based dynamic that serves to develop the moral compass. Wherein Pentecostal and Sufi spirituality encourage an internal effort to regulate moral attitude according to the desire to unify the heart to the presence of the Pentecostal sense of the Spirit, or the Sufi sense of the Beloved. In this way, ethical orientation is achieved by priming emotion in order to interpret what is right from wrong, transcending conscious efforts of logic and reason.

Keywords: Pentecostalism, Winnicott, Sufism, Infant-caregiver dynamic, Sufism, Ethical orientation

Introduction

This paper explores the notion that the true essence of what one believes is located within emotional intention rather than logic and reason, and, therefore, ethical judgement is predetermined according to how one feels. In order to conceptualise a theory that proposes how emotion serves in a process that influences ethical formation, one should acquire an understanding of how emotive functionality takes precedence when one responds to an equation that calls for logic and reason.

The study of ethical formation has provided theorists with a mountain of workable models to demonstrate a logical sequence of investigating a method of processing information that reflects good practice. As such, rational deliberation offers many forms of analysis in providing a method to execute judgement. For example, deontological modality provides the essence of how one should conduct behaviour and ‘is concerned with the necessity or possibility of acts performed by

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morally responsible agents’ (Lyons 1977, 823). In this way, deontological efforts of reasoning rely on cognitive processes and the ability to rationalise information by logically evaluating a possible outcome. Likewise, a utilitarian approach employs logical sequencing of where to place the importance of a situation for the greater good, whereby the right choice of moral standing is one that considers the best outcome for all parties involved.

This paper proposes that ethical formation precedes conscious awareness, assuming that it is subject to an internal regulatory system, primed by the individual’s aesthetic register (an internal system that processes information according to how one feels). This process determines a sense of moral judgement that is felt rather than logically sequenced, insinuating that an emotive structure regulates a sense of desire to do what is right. Therefore, the preliminary that governs behavioural conduct is initially unconsciously governed before it is consciously executed. Hence, Pentecostalism and Sufism both encourage the development of ethical orientation from an interpersonal encounter-based perspective to the idea of a greater Being that resides and is accessible within the metaphorical sense of the heart. Furthermore, one might suggest that the conclusion of this paper supports the notion that the human condition, in its quest for meaning and spirituality, transcends all denominational and cultural barriers.

Pentecostalism: The Significance of the ‘Spirit’

Pentecostals attempt to relate their interpretation of experience as closely as possible to the biblical scriptures, as Pentecostal theology essentially develops from a position of experiential reflectivity. According to this method of interpretation the individual expresses his or her behaviour by what the Spirit internally manifests. In this way, Pentecostalism provides a lens that magnifies an ideological concept of the Spirit that is accessible to whoever wishes for an intimate encounter-based hermeneutic approach to understanding the Christian faith. Parker further suggests that space for the Spirit to move is essential within the Pentecostal tradition (Parker 1996 191), as it creates transitional opportunity for the individual to develop a self-conscious desire to access the Spirit.

This type of interplay with the Spirit resembles practices that can be interpreted as meaningful behaviour. According to Nicholas Healey, practices are not mere behavioural patterns but intentional informed actions performed by human agents (Healey 2003, 287–308). Therefore, the place of Pentecostal worship encourages desire to express a sense of Self in proximity to the Spirit. The primary objective is to feel the spirit move and to act out its interpretation in a symbolic form. Therefore, the concept of the Spirit provides intention of meaningful behaviour.
John Inge postulates that ‘space has been Christified by the incarnation’ (Inge 2003, 57). Metaphorically speaking, this further suggests that the Spirit defines the Pentecostal place of worship, as it is the real subject of the congregants’ core reason to practise out faith, that it is the Spirit’s work that is constitutive (Healey 2003, 287–308). Therefore, it is the Spirit that provides meaning and value to the individual’s religious or spiritual orientation not deontological efforts of reason. However, scripture does indeed serve to guide, as Israel, Albrecht and McNally assert that ‘texts’ include not only written materials but also ‘rituals’ that assist communities to live and practice their interpretations (Parker 1996, 26).

Amos Young’s rendition of ‘Spirit activity’ implements a sense-based construct that places an emphasis on affective-somatic sign as conducive for Pentecostal worship. This spiritual pedagogic structure is a felt process that implements a mode of learning through the senses rather than logically sequencing information that is consciously perceived. This is where felt emotion is of significance when applying a biblical structure to behaviour. Young highlights the essentiality of sensory modality to convey ‘multiple modes of human knowing, […] especially in its kinesiological dimensions as manifest in the touch that is inspired by the Spirit’ (Young 2009, 167–188). This suggests that unconscious rhythms of meaning influence desire before it becomes consciously acknowledged. The true nature of Pentecostal identity is a celebration to desire the loving presence of the Spirit. Hence, ‘we love before we know’ (Smith 2009, 70).

Therefore, Pentecostalism may be defined as a denominational branch of Christianity that encourages interpersonal experience with the concept of the Spirit. This is developed through necessitating a form of interplay which provides an emotive framework that adheres to free expression. Hence, to grow in the Spirit is the intention of Pentecostalism, as the Church (a gathering of believers) is a spiritually living organism (Ephesians 4:16).

Sufism: A Way of Connecting to the Internal Sense of the ‘Beloved’

The definition of Sufism is difficult to express, as the core of this discipline is indeed the nature of the heart. Therefore, when referring to emotional discourse to convey a method for coming-to-know a particular practice that renders cathartic expression to determine a religious or spiritual position, one relies on the senses to yield what might be a true reflection of this practice:

Sufism is a mystical path of love in which God, or Truth, is experienced as the Beloved. The inner relationship of lover and Beloved is the core of the Sufi path. Through love the seeker is taken to God. The mystic seeks to
realize Truth in this life and God reveals Himself within the hearts of those who love Him’ (Vaughan-Lee 2012, 28).

The ideological notion that ‘God, or Truth, is experienced as the Beloved’ suggests that the individual who searches for meaning and purpose appropriates emotion to deliberate what is perceived to be the right form of moral action. In this way, actions of truth are executed according to a desire to be united with a true sense of what the ‘Beloved’ might mean to the individual. Taken literally, Sufism is the exploration of discovering the true essence of a praxis that encourages submission and love in order to gain closer proximity to the internal sense of the Beloved.

Hence, the way Sufism contributes to the psychosomatic nature of spiritual pedagogy is demonstrated through the ability to function according to the senses, regulating ‘tauba’ (repentance) through the will to desire ‘heart-felt’ change. St. Augustine of Hippo’s sentiment conveys this notion in The Confessions, that spirituality is emotionally led according to the will of the heart (Chadwick 1992, 147). Therefore, emphasis is placed on how one feels in proximity to his or her own ontology of what God, or truth, might subjectively mean.

In order to qualify a position that endorses the Sufi’s concept of intention and desire of the heart as the true essence of being, one is compelled to demonstrate that this can only be achieved by the practice of ‘dhikr’ (remembrance of God), ‘for the Sufi aspires to remember God in every moment, […] a remembrance of the heart, for it is the heart which holds the higher consciousness of the Self’ (Vaughan-Lee 2012, 28). Accordingly, for the Sufi it is the heart that harbours the desire to seek union with God, as the heart yearns to dwell in the presence of the Beloved.

**Transitional Progression as a Form of Spiritual Interplay**

According to Winnicottian psychoanalysis, transitional progression is only conceivable during the practice of interplay (Caldwell 2011, 28), an integral part of self-discovery facilitated by the mother’s (caregiver’s) response to the infant’s needs. This practice reduces anxiety in a manner that does not jeopardise the interpretative act, but rather provides the infant with an incentive to act out his or her discovery of what might be perceived as internal reality. In this way, Winnicott expresses that the dynamic of transitional progression adheres to a method of ‘holding’ (Abram 2007, 1851 and 4224), where ‘holding’ is defined as a state of comfort and security by attunement between the infant and the caregiver. This social dynamic emulates space to practise out self-actualisation in a playful mode. Therefore, the concept of ‘holding’ represents the mother’s ability to attune to the infant’s internal sense of reality, convening a method for creative play in attempting to achieve individuation (Winnicott 2005, 73).
The dynamic of attunement operates as a defining characteristic that determines healthy progression for the infant. For the infant, there is no distinction between the infant’s own identity and that of the caregiver’s, both parties are perceived as a unified whole. The essentiality of ‘holding’ remains a constituent for the infant, where the primal need for the presence of the caregiver is vital for the infant to successfully develop. Hence, the fabric of transitional awareness conditions a moral sense of orientation, as attachment to the caregiver conveys security (Koleva, et al. 2014, 185–194). By this practice the infant is unchallenged to exercise his or her own coming-to-be through transitional processes that lead to a care-based directive for moral development.

Thus, the same pragmatic feature which accounts for this dynamic affair between the caregiver and the infant may be applied to the functionality of spiritualism, such as Pentecostalism and Sufism. This is for the very reason that the internal concept of the caregiver (Spirit/Beloved) represents and attends to the individual’s needs by encouraging moral development according to an internal need to discover the Self in unison with the caregiver. Thus, this assertion implies that the dynamic of Pentecostal and Sufi spirituality should provide a type of ‘holding’ state, just like a mother holds her infant. This is analogous to a concept of the Spirit or the Beloved holding the individual. However, in order to make such a claim two points need to be expounded; firstly, to assert a methodology that insinuates a ‘holding’ state that encourages transitional progression; and secondly, to identify biological significance in order to authenticate this position.

This internal method of assessing the environment must be subject to an internal process that necessitates a moral code of conduct that primes the senses according to emotive intentionality. In this way, the emphasis of ethical decision making is determined by the conscience of the individual rather than a standardised set of impersonal statutes and laws. Pentecostalism provides an example of this notion as this denomination typically encourages emotional practices that render expression as coming-to-know truth through experience. The practice of interplay serves in this manner to structure the aesthetic register in order to respond in accordance with a bodily based function that conditions unconscious orientation. Nimi Wariboko highlights the significance of experience-led theology and terms it as play, ‘Pentecostalism is the sacred in a playful mode’ (Wariboko 2012, 53). Play, therefore, provides an insight as to how Pentecostal Christians practise their theology, by developing an internal desire to direct emotive behaviour. The activity of Wariboko’s sense of play harnesses the same properties of Winnicott’s developmental practice of interplay, as, when the child plays, he or she performs the act of becoming (Zuzanna 2007, 5–11). It is this method of interplay that attunes the mystical essence of Sufism to the aesthetic register by providing the individual with an emotive reason to worship and please the Beloved of the individual’s heart. This method provides a
sincere individual who seeks to discover truth with an ethical lens of how to process understanding of the world through the senses. Hence, practical functionality is initially precognitive until the formation of rational intention is established. Although interplay offers a method of understanding the world, it does so solely on the basis of the individual’s relationship with the caregiver (Winnicott 2005 191). One might suggest that the Sufi’s relationship to the Beloved is established in much the same way, through processes of affect regulation, as interpretative symbolic play stimulates emotional responses to situations that call for ethical judgement.

Therefore, within the context of Pentecostal and Sufi spirituality, the individual can discover a true sense of Self through transitional activity, subject to the caregiver’s presence; doing a good deed is simply a by-product of active creativity through seeking truth. Pentecostal and Sufi spirituality serve in this manner also as a means to understand a situation according to a true sense of Self in proximal relation to the idea of loving the Spirit/Beloved.

**A Bodily Based Method to Interpret and Understand the Environment**

So far, the proposition put forward assumes the position that the process of conditioning moral sense is subservient to more than just a matter of logic, but rather an unconscious attempt to orient a true sense of Self in proximity to a spiritual quest for truth. This notion yields that cathartic expression is necessary, for the ‘knowledge of God and knowledge of the self are interdependent’ (Hauerwas 2013, 27). This conjecture leads encounter-based spirituality to an emotional type of understanding, intimately linking selfhood and morality by forming a dialogue between fairness and care (Gilligan 1982, 175).

In this light, Wariboko emphasises the importance of play as an emotional directive, ascertaining that creativity is a practice that influences ethical formation. This is expressed through emotive involvement: ‘the process of creative emergence that figures and disfigures biological and social life.’ By assigning a creative component to ethical formation, Wariboko indicates a value for conditioning unconscious intention, suggesting that moral choice is a felt process rather than a reasoned one. To strengthen this idea, James K. A. Smith argues that biological affective connectivity verifies a sense of what the world presents according to the individual Self (Smith 2010, 65). In this way, one learns right from wrong by means of experience rather than conforming to deontological efforts: ‘we feel our way around the world’ (Smith 2010, 72). This form of awareness generates what Anthony Damasio proposes as a feeling of knowing that is ‘played out in the theater of the body’ (Damasio 2000, 8), emphasising the importance of neurobiological rhythms
of consciousness that condition the senses (Smith 2010, 67). This process orients desire to influence an awareness of conscious, logical assessment of what is morally right and wrong, building on Smith’s assertion that behaviour is unconsciously influenced. According to this principle, desire is the key to understanding the true intention of the will, discovering a sense of Self on a primal level. In this manner, rules delivered as a narrative or parable only steer the need to acquire the notion of ‘virtue’ (Hauerwas 2013, 95), as transitional progression aims to instil transcendent value. The observed effect of doing what is morally right permeates a desire to fulfil virtue ethics according to cathartic expression, where wisdom and knowledge operate as precursors (Devettere 2002, 95). Although sacred texts provide a sequence of applied knowledge regarding ethical reasoning, it is through attuning to the internal sense of what the Spirit or Beloved might require in order to orient the soul according to a moral way of conduct. This suggests that interdependent creativity is necessary in fulfilling a practice that bestows moral, transcendent identity, by the attachment process between the infant and the caregiver. For the Pentecostal or Sufi, this is achieved by emotionally learning ethical qualities by the desire to obtain the presence of the Spirit or the Beloved.

Henceforth, a care-based approach to a theory of ethical formation applies a code of interdependency between the individual and the maternal concept of the caregiver, asserting that the significance of the mother’s (caregiver’s) role and direct involvement during infancy are responsible for affectively developing moral conduct. In this way, the individual shares an emotional affinity with the caregiver as Nel Nodding suggests that ethical judgement is shaped by ‘eros’, the feminine spirit (Nodding 2013, 1). Milton Mayeroff also proposes that caring through the dynamic of relatedness assists in growth and self-actualisation (Mayeroff 1990, 1). These perspectives indicate that the caregiver moulds the individual’s worldview.

Therefore, according to this proposal, moral development emphasises maternal value as forming an affinity between the infant and the caregiver. Winnicott terms this process ‘primary psychic creativity’ (Winnicott 1965, 99), where the mother attends to the emotional needs of the infant, facilitating an environment of comfort and security. Thus, this ‘holding’ environment is only possible if the infant attunes to the caregiver according to a familiar dynamic of relatedness, as what might be externally perceived is internally sign-posted in accordance with emotional relatedness. Consequently, should the individual’s concept of the caregiver be displaced, the ability to process and order external stimuli will be disrupted as the adverse effects of anxiety are imminent due to an insufficient ‘holding’ environment.

**The Significance of the Caregiver’s Presence**

The study of kayak-angst provides evidence to suggest how interpersonal familiarity
is important when processing and assessing external reality. Kayak-angst is a psychological disorder that can induce a state of panic and lead to paralysis. This condition is mostly associated with the Inuit hunters of western Greenland that go out at sea alone. Michaela Amering and Heinz Katschnig support the notion that kayak-angst is a form of mental dysfunction that arises out of a state of disorientation, which is brought on by sensory deprivation in a situation that leads to perceiving ‘physiologic sensations’ as threatening, and this can trigger anxiety (Oldham and Riba 1995, 586). Thus, the significance of mentally regulating orientation according to a familiar setting is paramount for psychological stability, implying that an innate structure to learn the environment is essential.

By examining disassociation of familiarity, one can perceive how important Winnicott’s theory of transitional phenomena is when applied to the dynamic of the infant and caregiver structure, providing scope to suggest how significant interrelatedness actually is. In reference to kayak-angst, Zachary Gussow highlights the importance of a personal comforter, as in some cases the Inuit hunters would go out hunting with people that they knew and trusted in order to avoid feelings of anxiety (Gussow 1963, 18–26). Therefore, this comforter compensates for the loneliness and the lack of familiarity that is felt in the world. This process signifies that familiarity serves as a means for healthy development by entrusting the Self to a concept that emulates maternal attachment, regulating an interdependent exchange that ensures trust and security.

Henceforth, by emphasising an internal connection to the Spirit or the Beloved, transitional progression is based on the ability to care by metaphorically holding the individual to grow within a spiritually facilitated environment. This is achieved by administering maternal significance to the idea that the Spirit or the Beloved is the great caregiver responsible for the internal development of the soul, resembling the psychoanalytic notion of ‘good-enough mothering’ (Caldwell and Joyce 2014, 18–32). Accordingly, Winnicott developed this notion as good practice for maternal care, as it promotes the infant’s alleviation from anxiety by providing space to practise interplay. The essential component of creativity subjects the infant to moral codes of conduct by the acceptance or withdrawal of love (Winnicott 1965, 99). The ideological notion of good-enough mothering provides a psycho-creative component that is expressed between the caregiver and the infant (Abram 2007, 4213), supporting the theory that internal spirituality guides moral judgement by shaping emotive intention. Analogously, it is through the acknowledgement of feeling close to a transcendent being that emotionally led ethical orientation develops. In this way, experience of the transcendent typifies an occasion for the individual to learn ways of moral conduct, as he or she acquires to do what is right through honest intention. Thus, it is through experience that directly modifies
behaviour in accordance with what is emotionally perceived.

Traditionally, experience provided the basis of pedagogical development; for example, the original Hebrew word for ‘know’ is ידע, transliterated as ‘yada’, ‘which connoted knowledge as an experience of an object in relation to the subject’ (Johns 2012, 49). It is through interpretive action that a sense of knowing how to engage with the environment becomes subjectively clear. Aesthetic attunement to experience plays a role in preparing the individual to interpret and solve ethical dilemmas, in order to achieve a transformative experience. By this method the individual develops an identity that includes the notion of the Spirit or the Beloved through transitional means of stimulating desire through ‘yada’. Experience in this context is subjective, a creative method that encourages interaction through transvaluation and mediates personal knowledge of how to engage in the world through spiritual means.

The process of interpretation through emotive means relates experience of the Self to what is perceived as subjective truth. Mary Midgley suggests that there is a need to feel the ‘transcendental spiritual depth of the individual self’ (Best 1996, 142), as this provides the basis of an aesthetic reality according to the dynamic of an unconscious affective regulatory system.

Therefore, religious institutions that promote Pentecostalism or Sufism provide an environment for moral development and spiritual orientation, by which the individual may find solace in the formation of a belief system that encourages the notion of a transcendent Being. In this way, Pentecostalism and Sufism encourage a code of moral conduct to circumvent anxiety. This code of conduct belongs to a set of standards that constitute a theory of function that serve as a need to experience the love of the Spirit or the Beloved. This locates the function of transitional desire as the reason for atonement and discovering a true sense of Self in relation to the love of a transcendent Being.

Similarly, Winnicott’s model of ‘holding’ assumes an exchange, purporting socio-emotional mediation between the individual and the caregiver, developing neurobiological rhythms for self-discovery: ‘the basic elements are put in place enabling the individual to pursue a path of ethical self-realization’ (Meissner 2003, 21). Nodding highlights that the developmental processes are subject to moral sensitivity, adhering to attachment schemas formed in infancy, locating the sense of morality arising from an impulse in response to certain needs and feelings (Nodding 2013, 27). In order to provide a workable model for this theory it is necessary to examine the components that prime ethical judgement according to neurobiological conditioning.
Examining Neurobiological Activity in Priming Interpersonal Affective Regulation

The significance of interpersonal affective exchange during infancy should convey a theory of how the ability to process information according to social and psychical structures conveys interdependent relational value. Robert Emde provides evidence for interpersonal significance between the infant and caregiver, whereby ‘propensities for moral development are strongly biological, but require facilitation and direction through accumulated experiences within the infant-caregiver relationship’ (Schore 2009, 7574).

According to research investigating the effects of interpersonal exchange in moral cognitive development, psychical regulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, amygdala, and posterior superior temporal sulcus orchestrates and influences awareness that organises emotional response, rendering affective regulatory involvement (Decety, et al. 2011, 305–307). Paul Vitz further supports this notion as he demonstrates how the right hemispheric function stimulates emotional-imagistic progression (Schore 2009, 7578). This idea favours a theory that places progressive moral development as a product of ‘empathic processes’ (Schore 2009, 7578), where the right hemispheric function directs empathic structures that lead to a sense of moral identity, construing emotional response as part of its sequence.

These biological perspectives provide support to speculate that maternal care constitutes the basis of the infant’s ability to develop according to the caregiver’s presence. An unconscious directive provides a sense of awareness that orients the individual’s trust by conditioning his or her sense of dependency upon relational inter-subjectivity. The ideal state is to induce a ‘holding’ dynamic that signifies internal regulation as ‘[a]ttachment experiences thus directly impact the neurobiological substrate of moral development’ (Green 2003, 40).

In sum, the internal caregiver’s presence ignites arousal that stimulates the development of moral sensitivity. Jean Decety et al. further suggest that emotional and affective processes are responsible for later development of moral cognition as these systems are strongly related (Decety, et al. 2011, 305). Progressive studies in neuroscience confirm that both ‘affective reactions’ and ‘cognitive reasoning’ contribute to moral judgement. However, the functional role of the neural circuit of reciprocally connected regions demonstrates automatic affective activity that overshadows but also influences cognitive reasoning (Decety, et al. 2011, 306). Hence, this supports the idea that emotively guided ethical orientation precedes conscious awareness.
A good example that metaphorically expresses this sentiment can be demonstrated by the dynamic of improvised jazz (Calhoun 2004, 4708). As such, the musician understands the balance and technique jazz requires in ensuring the right riffs and direction of the music, keeping in line with the style of the genre. This is achieved according to the ability to feel the music by the right temperament of correct timing and rhythm. As Jerry Coker, an authority on jazz music explains, ‘five factors are chiefly responsible for the outcome of the Jazz player’s improvisation: intuition, intellect, emotion, sense of pitch, and habit’ (Coker 1987, 3). This sort of expression purports the musician’s feelings, expressed as creative play. Anyone can appreciate the expression of jazz, as ‘Jazz is made up of many intangible qualities that create appeal. This appeal becomes a matter of personal choice’ (Coker 1987, 81). Improvised jazz is not just sporadic sound but a system and style of music that evokes an emotive response. Like the jazz musician, the moral agent expresses ethical conduct through the instrument of the body.

**Conclusion**

This paper has attempted to introduce the idea that ethical formation adheres to a care-based theory of function, which is analogous to the process of maternal attachment. This interdependent exchange is subject to an emotive quality, attuning the sense of Self to a concept of the caregiver by regulating a state of transition through interplay in order to infer moral conduct. Therefore, this insinuates that the philosophies of Pentecostalism and Sufism reverberate a similar dynamic in much the same way as a mother attunes to her infant, where the concept of the Spirit or the Beloved, through the process of interplay, raises awareness of an omnipresent being that provides comfort and security while engaged in a practice of learning how to interpret right from wrong through a bodily based hermeneutic filter. Thus, Pentecostalism and Sufism encourage an emotive state of play that develops an internal moral compass according to what is emotionally felt.

Therefore, the dynamic of an internal concept of the Spirit or the Beloved should resonate with Winnicott’s theory of ‘good-enough mothering’ as this method supports the concept of a ‘holding’ state, suggestive of an environment for discovering a true sense of Self. This idea postulates that moral development is a product of relational interconnectivity that organically sustains the individual’s ability to make choices based on how one feels.

Finally, Pentecostalism and Sufism operate according to a dynamic similar to improvisatory jazz whereby internal spirituality is the instrument that one obtains through being nurtured by the internal love one has for the Spirit or the Beloved. This method is regulated according to a heart-felt way of understanding, influencing ethical orientation, by encouraging the individual to express his or her Self through the means of emotion.
Bibliography


Pedagogy of Care and Dialogue: A Theoretical Review of Approaches to Moral Education

Fatih Isik

This paper aims to offer a theoretical review of approaches to moral education and proposes a dialogic and care-based alternative to the conventional moral education approaches. It starts with a review and critique of the two most common approaches to moral education: traditional, moral character education and the cognitive developmental approach. Then, it explores an alternative strategy, Integrative Ethical Education (IEE), which prioritises dialogue and care in education. It is suggested that the IEE approach has the potential to address the issues that contemporary educators face.

Keywords: Moral education, Cognitive approach, IEE, Dialogue, Pedagogy

Introduction

This paper sets out to explore different approaches to education that are used by educators across the world, to better understand and discern their differences and to analyse their strengths and weaknesses. Traditional approaches to education can differ widely from more recent approaches that attempt to rectify some negative attitudes in traditional education that have been found to be wanting. In this sense, the paper discusses Integrative Ethical Education (IEE) as an example of an alternative to other forms of education. I start with a look at traditional moral education with its general characteristics and outlook. Then I analyse the cognitive developmental approach. Finally, I conclude my paper with a look at the IEE method, which is the focus of this study.

Traditional Moral Education

Traditional character education is usually associated with an instrumental and functional form of direct moral education (Benninga 1991; Solomon et al. 2002). The traditional approach puts forward ‘the inculcation of virtuous traits of character as the proper aim of education’ (Narvaez 2006, 703). It aims to maintain ‘the Great Tradition’ that regards education as the transmission of knowledge from adults to the younger generation (Wynne and Ryan 1993). Content is highlighted

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for teaching virtues rather than process, and environment for forming student behaviour (Wynne 1991). As well as the direct teaching of virtues, exemplary character traits, role-modelling and the reinforcement of good behaviour are emphasized (Snarey and Samuelson 2008, 55). Moral formation is monitored by parents, teachers, and any other moral authorities (ibid.). Cultural socialisation and cultural transmission are inherent means of teaching what is socially acceptable. Social norms influence the way the individual thinks, feels and acts. These norms are acknowledged and freely lived out in social spheres such as families, schools, and religious organisations (Coser and Rosenberg 1964).

The sociologist Durkheim (1903) believed in the significance of moral socialisation and attached importance to parenting, schooling and the wider community in children’s moral development and education. He argued that schools are supposed to raise responsible citizens through the internalization of various values (Arthur 2003, 90). He supported the school’s active involvement in inculcating social values and norms. His view of morality was quite functional in that morality needs to be taught in order to preserve society and the social order. To this end, schools are permitted, and also expected, to impose authority and discipline. Social rules are the most efficient means of control, not just because they come from society, but also because they are voluntarily digested to create a ‘society living in us’ (Coser and Rosenberg 1964). Durkheim postulated that what can be regarded as true for a larger society can also be considered true for a school classroom (Snarey and Samuelson 2008, 56).

Durkheim presupposed a proper and direct moral education (Snarey and Samuelson 2008, 55). Content is favoured over process. Parents, teachers, and other authority figures around are assigned the role of moral authority to provide discipline and to maintain social order. Moral pedagogy is conveyed through the direct teaching of virtues, exemplifying traits, role-modelling desired behaviour, and reinforcing good deed with rewards.

The three elements of Durkheim’s morality were also the end of moral education according to Durkheim (1903): the spirit of discipline, attachment to social groups, and autonomy. He endorsed the necessity of discipline, reward, and punishment in order to avoid the degeneration of society and the loss of social values. Although he was not in favour of blind submission to authority, he has been criticised by later progressives because of his tight attachment to duty and responsibilities as well as moral authority and discipline.

Piaget, similar to Durkheim, thought that morality is acquired through social immersion and interaction. However, Piaget rejected Durkheim’s understanding of proper and direct moral education. Durkheim (1903) believed that individuals
develop morally as a natural result of attachment to the group, which is manifested as respect for rules, symbols, and authority. In contrast, Piaget (1932) described this process as individuals constructing moral knowledge and internalizing it by struggling to make fair decisions. Thus, Durkheim (1903, 120) concluded that, ‘To teach morality is neither to preach nor to indoctrinate, it is to explain.’ Teachers are supposed to help children to understand both their duties and the reasons behind them.

Durkheim set out a direct pedagogy of moral education emphasizing content over the process of moral learning and teaching. He showed that moral rules are products of socialisation and that moral education is inevitably a social process. So, people learn to be moral through socialization and by internalizing the norms of a community, be it a small classroom, a school environment, or a larger society (1903). Durkheim attached an instrumental value to morality in schooling and believed that the individual is secondary to society and social rules (Arthur 2003).

In this approach, morality is readily available and good moral character entails the pursuit of such ready-made norms (Lapsley and Narvaez 2006, 261). Progressive approaches such as cognitive and indirect models of moral instruction are not trusted because they are eager to compromise the authority of the teacher in favour of more democratic practices. They are against tradition as they encourage students to discuss value-laden issues in a highly relativistic manner. Such practices arouse alternative opinions with regard to traditional values such as obedience and loyalty to one’s country (35). Wynne thought that there is no need for confusing children’s minds by asking them to rediscover those values:

Is it wise to ‘teach’ pupils that basic moral principles and conventions generally accepted by responsible adults should be considered de novo, and possibly rejected, by each successive adolescent cohort? Must each generation try to completely reinvent society? (Wynne 1991, 142)

However, the prioritisation of society, discipline and moral autonomy put Durkheim in a questionable position. Still, he left his legacy by reminding us of the indispensable place of discipline, socialisation, and modelling moral behaviour and moral authority in moral education, which are sometimes maintained at the expense of moral agency. Therefore, the pedagogy of traditional moral education has been contested for being outdated, inconvenient and superficial (Kohn 1997). It was critiqued by Kohlberg (1981; 1984) due to its overemphasis on a specific set of virtues together with socially desirable behaviour as an outcome. As a result of that, the real meaning of virtue cannot be conceived. For Kohlberg, in the traditional approach, the process of teaching was quite similar to indoctrination. He also did not acknowledge that individuals can be rewarded or punished on
the basis of social norms and rules. Similarly, Kohn (1997) did not approve of the employment of memorisation, exhortation, and punishment for teaching morality since those would not really foster learning.

The following section is going to introduce one of the key representatives of a more progressive model of moral character education. Piaget had reservations about the traditional model of direct moral instruction and proposed a more consensually democratic view of the classroom, with a shared role between students and teachers, with students being at the centre.

**Cognitive Developmental Approach**

The cognitive developmental approach prioritises the process rather than the content for a child’s cognitive moral progress. In this sense, the basic premise of Piaget’s approach is that ‘all knowledge is constructed’ (Noddings 1995, 115). The child is a lone learner and constructs moral knowledge through interaction with the environment. Moral education is in the hands of the individual as well as his peers (Snarey and Samuelson 2008, 55). Hence, the child is called the ‘moral philosopher’, an agent actively building up her or his own thinking on what is right and what is wrong. The role of school and teachers is limited to ensuring ‘the participation of the student in moral thought and action through moral dilemma discussions, role play, collaborative peer interaction, and a democratic classroom and school culture’ (55). Therefore, Piaget also sees schools as moral institutions (Arthur 2003, 62) where heteronomous and autonomous morality can be observed.

In heteronomous morality, the individual submits to rules because of the fear of the authority. Children accept the authority and the rules without questioning. However, in the case of autonomous morality, children follow the rules because they understand them and feel the necessity to do so. Children freely choose to do so as a consequence of an internal conviction. Piaget (1932) was aware of the fact that heteronomous morality is a natural part of an adult-child relationship, but he also knew that autonomous children are more confident, respect themselves and others, have strong motivation, and are open to cooperating with other children. That is why, according to Piaget, schools have to create opportunities for children to become more autonomous in their moral choices.

Although he published his work soon after Durkheim’s, Piaget (1932, 362) considered his position in regard to moral development and education as the ‘opposite pole from the Durkheimian pedagogy’. He believed that educators with an indoctrinative authority role will only foster a more childish reasoning (Snarey and Samuelson 2008, 56). Piaget was in favour of a more democratic teaching environment in which children are provided with a healthy atmosphere to cognitively
move forward to more autonomous thinking. He was against intervention by an
authority. Piaget (1970, 715) reported that ‘[e]ach time one prematurely teaches a
child something he could have discovered himself, that child is kept from inventing
it and consequently from understanding it completely’. So, a child actually does
not need adult intervention for learning, and adult authority might even cause a
child to move to less autonomous cognition. Piaget (1932, 363–364) detailed his
position:

The problem is to know what will best prepare the child for its future task of
citizenship. Is it the habit of external discipline gained under the influence
of unilateral respect and of adult constraint, or is it the habit of internal
discipline, of mutual respect and of ‘self-government?’… For ourselves we
regard as of the utmost importance the experiments that have been made to
introduce democratic methods into schools. We therefore do not at all agree
with Durkheim in thinking that it is the master's business to impose or even
to ‘reveal’ rules to the child.

Piaget alternatively suggested a safer way of learning and cognitive moving up:
building more trusting relationships and interacting with peers. Schools are
expected to facilitate such an environment. Rather than imposing moral authority
and rules, schools can also create platforms so that students can discuss and speak
out their ideas, testing them out with their peers. Given that, a school teacher has
quite a difficult role in Piaget’s classroom: she is supposed to provide students with
opportunities for self-discovery and problem solving instead of imposing specific
rules and norms. Therefore, schools should attach importance to ‘co-operative
decision making, and problem solving, nurturing moral development by requiring
students to work out common rules based on fairness’ (Murray 1997). In addition,
schools can also engage children in activities that require participatory involvement
for taking responsibility. Smith et al. (2011, 332) recommended activities such as
‘being elected to the school council, being a class representative, and taking part in
a peer support service’.

Although Piaget supported peer interaction for moral development, he did not
provide a detailed account of how such interaction might enhance a child’s
development. Smith et al. (2011, 331) elaborated this process further:

a) By adapting their own actions to those of their peer group, children are
led to construct new ways of behaving which they could not have arrived at
on their own.

b) From the experience of being challenged, for example in situations of
conflict, children internalize new patterns of behaviour.
c) Thus the process of engaging in various types of challenging social encounter becomes a source of cognitive progress.

d) However, initial social competencies are necessary for the individual child to benefit from a particular type of social situation. If it is too challenging, the child may become discouraged and feel less competent than before.

All in all, it can be said that Piaget set children free from authority so as to build their own moral confidence and autonomy. Peer interaction certainly has a significant place in moral development and education. Dilemmas and discussions help children to justify their moral position and test out their moral reasoning. Those valuable aspects of moral education are emphasised by Piaget and his tradition.

On the other hand, Piaget missed out the social side of moral education and this, to a certain extent, requires the moral authority of teachers in a school context and parents in a family context. Cognitive developmental theory creates serious concerns when it comes to the classroom and the school environment. These will be raised after a discussion of the Kohlbergian pedagogy of moral education and his idea of ‘just community schools’. Kohlberg’s understanding and the pedagogy of moral education are quite similar to Piaget’s, and his methodology develops the tradition of the cognitive development approach for moral education (Snarey and Samuelson 2008, 57). Like Piaget, Kohlberg also regarded the child as a philosopher who actively engages, understands, and constructs his or her world. With this in mind, the role of an educator is to create such conditions and facilitate such development naturally through ethically stimulating activities (Murray 1997). Optimum conditions for moral development can be sustained by providing cases and activities that encourage students to choose between moral variables.

Kohlberg believed that education of morality should be designed considering the stages of moral development, so the goal of such education needs to be to help students to reach a higher stage in their moral development (Power, Higgins and Kohlberg 1989). Although Kohlberg was against the idea of inculcating specific virtues as the pedagogy of moral education, he also resisted the idea of moral relativity in favour of the principles of justice and fairness. He believed that justice can provide a comprehensive moral ground for everyone based on his observations in a variety of cultures around the world (Kohlberg and Turiel 1971).

Although Kohlberg had a similar view of learning and development to Piaget’s in terms of the position of the centralisation of the individual, later revisions of Kohlberg proposed the integration of the individual with the community. Re-reading Durkheim and reconciling his views with Piaget’s theory, Kohlberg softened Durkheim’s approach to a more democratic level. He realised that schooling is a
social phenomenon by default and so is the development of morality. Teaching entails a particular degree of authority and some form of indoctrination as well. He sincerely confessed this in his later revisions (Kohlberg 1978, 14–15):

It is not a sufficient guide to the moral educator, who deals with concrete morality in a school world in which value content as well as structure, behaviour as well as reasoning, must be dealt with. In this context, an educator must be a socialiser, teaching value content and behaviour, not merely a Socratic or Rogerian process-facilitator of development. In becoming a socialiser and advocate, the teacher moves into ‘indoctrination’, a step that I originally believed to be invalid… I no longer hold these negative views of indoctrinative moral education, and now I believe that the concepts of guiding moral education must be partly ‘indoctrinative’. This is true, by necessity, in a world [in] which children engage in stealing, cheating and aggression and in a context wherein one cannot wait until children reach the fifth stage to deal directly with moral behaviour… Now I believe that moral education can be in the form of advocacy or ‘indoctrination’ without violating the child’s rights if there is an explicit recognition of shared rights of teachers and students and as long as teacher advocacy is democratic, or subject to the constraints of recognizing student participation in the rule making and value upholding process.

With a synthesis of Durkheim’s communitarian approach and Piaget’s lone philosopher, Kohlberg recreated a model of moral education which is known as ‘just community schools’. Kohlberg (1983, xiii) explained the background for this model as follows:

Continuing work in the schools led me to a view … that moral education must deal directly with action and not just with reasoning, with ‘real life’ situations not just with hypothetical ones… It led me to the formulation of a participatory democracy or ‘just community’ as the context for moral discussion and moral education. Our theory of moral education then, is changing and… developing through an interchange between psychological theorists and practitioners.

So, through his model of just community schools, Kohlberg amalgamated the Piagetian cognitive developmental approach with Durkheimian moral education as socialisation. He merged moral content with moral thinking. He forged direct instruction with indirect. He reconciled the individual with the community. He recreated a balance by giving the priority to the collective aspect but also ensuring the rights of the individual (Snarey and Samuelson 2008, 58).

Kohlberg’s later emphasis on moral culture and creating a moral atmosphere reflects the change in his understanding and his move to a more developmental-socialisation
approach. Nevertheless, this is still going to be a softer version of a social approach compared with Durkheim’s position. Realising the fact that morality is not only an individual but also a social business, Kohlberg endorsed the necessity of creating a moral culture within the school. On the other hand, he was quite vigilant to avoid elements that might hinder individual autonomy and independent decision making. Hence, the kind of school community that he specified as the most beneficial was ‘a democratically governed group, one that recognizes the rights and responsibilities of each other and to the group as a whole’ (Snarey and Samuelson 2008, 64). For Kohlberg, the types of value that a school atmosphere should be promoting were ‘sense of community, democratic values, personal autonomy, individual rights and responsibilities, a sense of fair play and collective responsibility’ (ibid., 66). Kohlberg’s ideal community is the one that fosters moral ideals, moral goals and actions, on one hand, while encouraging moral reasoning on the other.

Developmental approaches are usually found impractical when it comes to in-class practices. Although cognitive developmental theorists recommend that teachers should regard specific proposed stages in classrooms, teachers generally do not know about these theories. What is worse, Carr (2002) warned teachers against such theories and called them to be vigilant (cited from Arthur 2003):

> Teachers need to be careful to avoid giving uncritical acceptance and general application to any particular cognitive, emotional or behavioural theory in the classroom. These kinds of theories are not general educational theories but are often used to promote progressive teaching methods without a full consideration of their implications for teaching, positive or otherwise.

Arthur (2003, 73) criticised cognitive developmentalists for attributing universality to their findings which may ‘go beyond that which their methodology and data can justify’. Psychologists build a thesis on the results of experiments, interviews, and direct observations. Kupperman (1991, 161) claimed, ‘No questionnaire can distinguish between what a person’s moral genuinely is, what a person pretends his or her moral to be and what a person thinks his or her moral to be’. He also suggested that the student who scores high on moral development tests and shows good habits may surprise the teacher at times of temptation. Likewise, Hunter (2001, 23) believed that moral education needs to be saved from ‘the tyranny of popular psychology’ and its claims about scientific objectivity.

Developmental theorists reject strong authority exercised by parents at home as well as teachers in the classroom for fear that children might lose their autonomy. For them, parents and teachers are expected to provide opportunities for children to make moral reasoning, justify their reasons and then make their own decisions (Piaget 1932; Kohlberg 1981), whereas Ryan (1989, 15) argued, ‘Character
development is directive and sees the teacher in a more active role than does the cognitive developmental tradition.

Cochran (1989), adopting a more sociological aspect, suggested, ‘Acceptance of authority, loyalty to ideals, and commitment to a historical community, though they do require sacrifice and closure of options, are the very stuff of character building’. Cochran glorified the functions of society and means of socialisation, neglecting the value of being individual. This highly authoritarian perspective is open to exploitation and bears some hints of totalitarianism in itself. This is one of the main reasons character education stands on such a disputable ground.

According to social theories of character education, habit formation and character development are results of the process of socialisation. Schools as social organisations inevitably transmit some values. Johnson put it briefly: ‘Character development is a social not an individual process, because being human is a social not an individual phenomenon’ (1987). According to this approach, we are not so autonomous in building our character, indeed the process of our moral development depends on others. That is, society is primary to individual.

On the other hand, social perspectives of character education are criticised for undermining the value of human autonomy. Duncan (1997) responded to this perception and blamed character education as actually a tool for assimilation, which is a result of social interaction. Arthur (2003, 98) demonstrated that although there has been much sociological research on social behaviour and character in the last few decades, it seems impossible to encounter any agreed basis and conclusion. He concluded that contemporary sociology of education offers few practical solutions for character education.

**Pedagogy of Care and Integrative Ethical Education**

Noddings’s caring alternative to moral and character education sets attending to student needs as the goal of educating the young. Caring is at the very heart of moral education (Noddings 2002, 15). Starting from the period of infancy, caring is vital for developing all relations. An infant, for instance, enjoys the care so much that he or she learns to respond to it with a smile. The care-giver becomes profoundly pleased with that smile and seeks to produce more smiles by caring more. This turns into a ‘mutually satisfying relation’ (ibid.). Hence, children need to be cared for and taught how to take and give care. This view of moral education is not limited to children only but applies to anybody that we encounter. In this respect, care pedagogy differs essentially from a Kantian approach to moral education. Kant would argue that everyone’s moral perfection is their own business and project, while care ethics grants that ‘we remain at least partly responsible for the moral
development of each person we encounter’ (ibid.). This brings a broader view of moral education that takes it from home and school into the wider context of life experiences.

The perspective of caring offers a relational alternative to moral education. The components of such alternative pedagogy are modelling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation (Noddings 2012, 10). Modelling is quite a common pedagogy and can be observed in both traditional and progressive accounts of moral education. Morally acceptable and desirable behaviour needs to be performed by parents and teachers. Dialogue is particularly critical in the pedagogy of care. Ideally, teachers are supposed to establish sound dialogue with students so that they can find out and attend to their needs. Students respond more when their teachers are open to listening (ibid.).

Practice is also commonly mentioned as a pedagogy for moral education. In the view of care ethics, it is also regarded as the development of empathy. Thus, the goal of such practice is diverted to feeling what others feel and being attentive to their needs. The role of the moral educator from the perspective of care ethics is to help a student discover the feelings of others (ibid.). Finally, confirmation is indeed not commonly held as pedagogy in the tradition of care ethics. Nonetheless, drawing on Buber's ideas, Noddings (2012, 11) placed confirmation as a vital element of a caring pedagogy, describing it as ‘an act or series of acts that helps another recognise and develop his/her better self’ (ibid.). This becomes a powerful tool especially when a teacher acknowledges the better self of a student who has committed an undesirable act. Such an act might create a realisation that ‘this powerful other sees in me a better self’ (ibid.) and actually foster the emergence of a better self.

IEE is a holistic, comprehensive, and empirically derived model of moral character education (Narvaez 2006; 2008; Narvaez and Lapsley 2009). It exhibits an effort to combine ancient philosophy with current scientific research on human flourishing and cultivation. It incorporates individuals as well as community as fostered by cognitive, social, and biological views (Narvaez 2008, 316). Learning is considered to be relational, so it is aimed at fostering a caring relational community of learning.

The basic foundation of IEE is developing morality and moral expertise (Narvaez 2006). Expertise development integrates two different understandings of moral development: cognitive development and virtue ethics pedagogies. This can be easily recognised in the educational implications of the theory. The first implication is that educators should address both processes and skills for moral behaviour (ibid., 11), the second is that educators should take into account both moral virtue and reasoning (ibid., 12).
Narvaez had reasons to advocate moral expertise. She believed that experts and novices are different from each other in several ways (Narvaez 2008, 312). First, experts know more, and their knowledge is better organised. Second, they have implicit, explicit, and situational knowledge. That is to say, they can distinguish what knowledge to access, which procedures to apply, as well as how to apply it or them (ibid.). Third, they approach and view events differently from novices with awareness of underlying patterns and an understanding of necessity. Finally, experts behave automatically without an effort, whereas novices have to spend conscious effort to solve a problem (Narvaez 2006, 11).

For Narvaez (2008), virtuous people are very much like experts with highly trained skills. Moral expertise requires the right virtue at the right time in the right place (Narvaez 2008, 312). The implication of moral expertise as an educational pedagogy is the establishment of novice-to-expert instruction in the school, as children are novices in almost all domains. The teacher is regarded as the moral exemplar and moral authority. Moral intuitions are cultivated through imitation of role models (Narvaez and Lapsley 2009, 261). Feedback needs to be provided in a way that is both timely and appropriate. Mentor guidance is needed while being immersed in the activity. Multiple contexts need to be created for procedure (Narvaez et al. 2003). Adults – teachers in the school context – guide children through dialogue and theoretical explanations and guidance in selecting activities, and the right environment for developing good intuition might be needed.

Narvaez designed a five-step strategy for implementing IEE in schools. These steps can be practised simultaneously, but to start a step-by-step application might be more practical. These steps can be listed as follows (Narvaez 2008, 316–321; also see Narvaez 2006):

1. Establish a caring relationship with each student;
2. Establish a climate supportive of achievement and ethical character;
3. Teach ethical skills across the curriculum and extra-curriculum using a novice-to-expert pedagogy;
4. Foster student self-authorship and self-regulation; and
5. Restore the village: asset-building communities and coordinated developmental systems.

Narvaez also put these steps into practice in school, in the family, and in other relevant contexts. These steps are reminiscent of the Character Education Project’s eleven principles, which will be raised in later sections dealing with character.
education practices (Lickona et al. 2007). Caring community, academic and ethical focus, curricular and extra-curricular activities with an ethical focus, and community coordination are some of the aspects that have been emphasised in both strategies. All the steps considered, Narvaez’s moral expertise is quite distinctive, a methodology which would be supported by Plato, Aristotle and MacIntyre. Novice-to-teacher instruction is an adaptation of Vygotsky’s constructivist pedagogical concepts of the ‘zone of proximal development’ and ‘scaffolding.’ Vygotsky (1935) also viewed children as apprentices to adults. They naturally require guidance and ‘scaffolding’ to move on to a higher learning stage. Narvaez successfully adapted this to moral character education, developed strategies for moral expertise and integrated them into her model.

IEE was implemented as part of a character education project by the Community Voices and Character Education Project (Narvaez 2006, 17). Assessments of this indicated that those schools which deeply implemented the ethical development programme gained higher scores, especially in terms of ethical sensitivity and concern for other people. On the other hand, the schools with minimal implementation showed little sign of any positive effect. As a holistic model which considers all the aforementioned approaches to moral development and moral character education, IEE is one of the most promising views of moral character education. It addresses all aspects of morality: emotional, cognitive and behavioural. It is concerned with virtue development. It incorporates moral content with moral process, and so integrates direct and indirect methods of teaching. Freudian early child development is taken into consideration as well. It is aware of the necessity for family and community involvement.

It does not, however, tell us very much about how to train teachers for instructing moral character education, or how to improve the school and the outside-school community. Narvaez (2008, 320) was well aware of the negative messages from popular culture, the media, and the outside community, but she failed to offer any practical strategy for developing moral culture and atmosphere outside the home and school contexts.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I have tried to explain and expand on the educational strategy of IEE and how it places dialogue at the centre of its educational framework. I have juxtaposed IEE with two more widely known educational frameworks, namely moral character education in the traditional sense and the cognitive developmental approach to education. I provided a general review of these two approaches and criticised their shortcomings. In sum, the paper argues that the Integrative Ethical Education approach could be the much-needed remedy to mend the issues that
are found in other educational approaches. In light of these discussions, it can be argued that dialogue and care are indispensable in education, and as an approach that focuses on these two central concepts, IEE as an alternative educational strategy has the capability to transform education to become more dialogue- and care-centred and complement the aspects of education that the other educational approaches fail to address adequately.
References


Reflection: The Challenge and Power of Dialogue

Diana Francis

The word ‘dialogue,’ though in its dictionary definition the equivalent of ‘conversation,’ is most often used with a sense of purpose, usually that of bridging a gap of some kind, ending alienation, or resolving conflict.

Like most people, I have had plenty of experience with dialogue: in my case as a family member and as a parent, trying to reach agreements with teenagers; as a peace activist, trying to achieve consensus in groups and committees and trying to engage with a sceptical public; as a third party facilitator of dialogue in conflicts between neighbours and within organisations; and, particularly, in situations of violent or potentially violent conflict between politicians and/or armed groups. I have used this opportunity for reflection to gather together some of the salient things I have learnt over the years, from others involved in nonviolent activism and peace making and from my own experience. I have focused on dialogue as something distinct from negotiation, though the two things often overlap, especially at a point where the focus is on practical solutions of a political nature.

Needs and Provisions

Even without any pre-existing conflict, dialogue can be difficult. Each person speaks from their own inner world, with its emotions, assumptions, beliefs, life experience, and preoccupations. Each sees the questions under discussion in the light of their own experience. Each is motivated by their own needs and fears, conscious and unconscious.

In situations of longstanding conflict, especially where violence has taken place, emotions will already be deep seated and intense. These will make themselves felt in any associated dialogue, both through the words used by the speaker and in the way in which those words are understood by the hearer. The perceived power

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relationships between the different parties will also affect the dynamics of the exchange. Dialogue calls for the building of trust, respect, and a willingness to talk with each other on the basis of human equality – no easy task in such circumstances.

Given these challenges, the context in which dialogue takes place is of great importance. A neutral, safe venue that is acceptable to both or all parties is the first essential, along with agreements about the confidentiality of the process: what, if anything, can be told to whom about anything discussed. Any ‘leaks’ of information can threaten the process – and lives. Such a dialogue will usually call for the help of a facilitator or facilitators (by whatever name) who have the trust of each of the parties and will be relied upon to ‘hold the process,’ so making the parties feel as safe as possible to speak and setting an example of respect for each participant, and for their culture, while encouraging them to show the best of themselves in their behaviour.

In the case of deep-seated and complex conflicts, the facilitation is likely to be provided by a team rather than by one individual, since the process may last a long time and call for facilitator availability at short notice when crises occur. In addition, separate conversations are likely to be needed between one or more facilitators and the separate parties, both before and during the process, to help them reflect on their own position and the way in which they are representing it. The ‘modelling’ of cooperation between facilitators is helpful too and can make a process seem less intense. Furthermore, as part of a team, the facilitators are able to support each other, digest what is happening, give each other feedback, and plan the next steps.

**Deep Feelings and Connections**

The more challenging the conflict, the more relationships will matter. Dialogue is not a technical affair but a deeply human one in which personal respect and increasing trust and warmth can be transformative. The deepest understanding and change come when people are prepared to make themselves vulnerable to each other. Years ago, I read the first edition of Cornelius and Fare's book, *Everyone Can Win*, and have used their idea of ‘needs and fears mapping’ on countless occasions. It is helpful, as intended, as a tool for facilitators to analyse and understand what motivates the different parties to a conflict. I have found it even more helpful for the parties to use, enabling them to understand their own needs and fears and explain themselves to their dialogue partners.

It is my experience that even the most hardened opponents, given the right support, are capable of empathy and generosity. I have seen a military leader famed for his cruelty who, at a moment of crisis in a vital conversation, prevented by his superior from making the kind of political gesture that would have defused the situation,
chose instead to confess his past cruelty and cite a particularly chilling example of it. Through this act of confession, in one sense irrelevant to the business in hand, he transformed the dialogue’s dynamic.

That episode confirmed for me the primary importance of feelings, as against logic and strategy, in human relationships and responses. This means that dialogue processes can be greatly enhanced through the informal interactions that take place in the dinner queue or in organised events such as football matches. When there is an aspect of cultural or religious identity that is shared by the conflicting parties and transcends the conflict in question, traditional ceremonies, acts of worship, and other symbolic acts appeal to a deeper level of human commonality and allegiance and can be deeply moving for those involved – and indeed for facilitators if they are included. They deepen growing bonds and hence the commitment of the parties to the dialogue process. If agreements are eventually reached, those shared experiences will make them harder to go back on.

**Reaching Agreement**

When the building of trust and understanding have prepared the ground sufficiently, the time will be ripe for focusing on possible agreements to resolve the conflict between the parties present and those whom they represent. With positive relationships established, a process of cooperative problem solving process will be possible, rather than the kind of antagonistic hard bargaining that negotiation often entails: one characterised by flexibility and creativity in creating the components of a solution that will address the needs and fears of the different parties.

However, an agreement reached in such a way and by individuals who are typically a step below those at the top of the power pyramid may not have the authority to make the necessary commitments on behalf of those they represent. Even if they had it in theory, in practice the political support at home may prove to be lacking. Some of the colleagues of those involved in talks may feel that their interests have not been served, and a top leader may decide to pull back when called upon to implement an agreement.

Unless there have been regular press and other briefings, if the dialogue has been held privately and in confidence, the supporters of different parties and the public at large may be unaware of the direction that a dialogue has taken, let alone the point it has reached. (Thus the Oslo Accords, welcomed with such jubilation around the world, did not win the acceptance and implementation at home that could have begun to resolve the tragic conflict in Israel/Palestine.)

A much wider process of dialogue may be needed to bring others on board, preferably
at an early stage: a societal conversation that can mobilise a ‘peace constituency’ and widen support for dialogue among political or military leaders. Members of that peace constituency can also keep those leaders in touch with the popular mood and let them know what is likely to be broadly acceptable to most people in an eventual settlement.

**Oppression and Dialogue**

A ‘peace constituency’ of a different kind is needed in situations where ‘the people,’ or some sections of them, are oppressed or marginalised by those who govern them. Such a situation of extreme injustice or ‘unpeace’ in which the people dare not speak out and resist their oppression (as has been the case until very recently in Zimbabwe) is a hidden conflict: one that is waiting to happen.

No government will sit down in dialogue with people who have no collective voice or negotiating power. That position changes when a dialogue begins between those who have thought of themselves as powerless. That dialogue, often secret at first, enables them to realise that a dictatorship relies on their acquiescence and that if they begin to think and move together and withdraw their cooperation from the system, their power will increase, and when they find a public voice and extend their dialogue to others, to build their movement, the power relationship will shift and the beginnings of change will come within sight.

However, if there is no communication with the powers-that-be, if dialogue is not constantly on offer, if public communication is characterised only by anger and hate, rather than by commitment to a shared vision for the future, and if that vision does not include every sector of society, the dreamt-of future will not be achieved. After the traumas and on-going disasters of the ‘Arab Spring,’ it is time for the rhetoric of ‘nonviolent revolution’ to be replaced by the language and mind-set of nonviolent transformation: a more patient but no less courageous process. Deep change comes only when people begin to think differently, when relationships change, and when there is ‘buy-in’ from a good majority of the population. The dialogue needed will take countless forms and will have to include the healing of the past as well as understanding of the present and shaping of the future; but it will lead in the end to a peace built to last.

**A Global Dialogue: The Need of our Time**

Conflicts will be present in any healthy human collective, even in a truly just, democratic, and peaceful society; so, the practice of respectful and empathic dialogue will always be essential to the maintenance of genuine peace and true security. Right now, however, that practice is constantly disrupted by a system of geopolitics that is
based on the contest for power and control between major economic and military powers. The efforts made within and between communities and societies to build understanding and co-operation are constantly overwhelmed by this global contest. Seemingly unstoppable ‘extremist’ violence continues because the only means of stopping it that seems to be considered by governments is counter-violence: fire against fire; and those who would outlaw nuclear weapons ownership by others persist in ‘upgrading’ their own capacity for nuclear genocide.

Despite and because of our global dominance, human beings are critically insecure, as result of the greed and folly of believing that getting the better of each other, consuming more, and exploiting the earth and its resources is a fit purpose for living. Countless numbers of us are already suffering and dying as a result – from local wars fuelled by hegemonic agendas and global divisions, from famine, displacement, and environmental destruction. Mass migration is unstoppable and climate change, which is already ravaging our planet and could bring about the extinction of our own and countless other species, is yet to be slowed down, let alone halted.

If we can only recognise what we are doing, acknowledge our interdependence, and see that our capacity for dialogue – for communicating and connecting with others through empathy – is the greatest gift we have as human beings, we will join a growing movement of people in a conversation (see www.rethinkingsecurity.org.uk) across all boundaries to build a peace constituency like no other, whose aim is to re-imagine human security and wellbeing and create a new, shared narrative which even our leaders will begin to adopt, and so [as] to transform policy, nationally and internationally, to reflect the fact that our future will depend not on economic muscle and armed might but on dialogue, cooperation and the recognition of our human and ecological interdependence.

Humanity can yet step back from the brink and build a kind and sustainable world. The future is in our hands. I will close with the words of Edward O. Wilson, whose book *The Social Conquest of Earth* ends thus:

> Earth, by the twenty-second century, can be turned, if we so wish, into a permanent paradise for human beings, or at least the strong beginnings of one. We will do a lot more damage to ourselves and the rest of life along the way, but out of an ethic of simple decency to one another, the unrelenting application of reason, and acceptance of what we truly are, our dreams will finally come home to stay.

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BOOK REVIEW

Frances Sleap

**Talk Matters!: Saving the World One Word at a Time; Solving Complex Issues Through Brain Science, Mindful Awareness and Effective Process**
Mary V. Gelinas

Mary Gelinas’s suitably emphatically titled ‘Talk Matters!’ is a wide-ranging, practical and passionate contribution to the building of constructive conversations. It draws on her own extensive experience in facilitation and process design as well as on insights from brain science and mindfulness practices.

The book has four sections, focusing respectively on: the need for constructive talk; understanding and management of our survival instincts; attitudes and skills for fruitful interaction; and process design. In the first section, ‘Why Talk Matters’, Gelinas starts by setting out the ‘perfectly human storm’ of our era. The problems we humans face are complex, both in themselves and because of the diversity of people involved; our brains’ ancient self-protective impulses can hijack our more rational inclinations; the ineffective way in which we often communicate triggers self-protective responses in others; and the processes we use for complex conversations are not fit for purpose. Gelinas, with unabashed optimism, proposes a powerful combination of brain science, mindfulness practices and well-designed interactive processes as a means of ‘saving the world’. In chapters 2 and 3 she gives

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an introduction to pertinent findings from brain science which can provide insight into what commonly goes wrong in complex conversations, and into the conditions which promote the sense of safety we need to operate at our best. Chapter 2 introduces the different regions and functions of the brain in the context of their evolutionary development, while chapter 3 focuses on the functions and impacts of emotions. Section 2 proposes ways of managing our unruly brains with their survival instincts. Chapter 4 introduces mindfulness practices and evidence of the impact they can have on our wellbeing and interactions, for instance, helping us to be more resilient and less reactive. Chapters 5 and 6 build on this with practical suggestions for better defining intentions and for opening ourselves to change.

Section 3, on ‘Interacting Constructively’, begins in chapter 7 with ideas on cultivating compassion, as well as observations on compassion as something for which humans are inherently wired. It includes a suggested compassion meditation. Chapter 8 advocates engagement with those who differ from us, which is crucial for properly informed and fair decisions and for the commitment of people who may be delivering these. The importance of bridging social capital which connects different groups within society is illustrated. Chapter 9 proposes ‘six indispensable communication skills’, which include listening attentively, asking ‘learner’ instead of ‘judger’ questions, and making suggestions about the process. Section 4 addresses the problem of ill-designed conversational processes, such as the isolating and prospectively intimidating format of the traditional town hall meeting. Gelinas draws on examples of stakeholder engagement and organisational deliberation to support the advice she gives and includes useful blueprints for planning constructive processes.

One of the appealing and impressive things about this book is its holistic approach. Gelinas has a strong sense of the range of ingredients involved in achieving good, productive talk and is as comfortable introducing us to mindfulness as she is in recommending further reading on process design. Any writer on dialogue will have a concern with the states of mind with which people enter into conversational encounters, but Gelinas takes this aspect of communication particularly seriously and gives numerous insightful suggestions. The engagement with mindfulness is apt, as its outcomes appear so inclined to benefit the way we handle difficult or complex conversations. One of various points which lingered in my mind was chapter 8’s notion of avoiding pigeon-holing oneself as well as others, lest one trap oneself in an unduly restricted range of possibilities. This is very much a book to put into practice, and it is effectively structured to serve that function, with key points and questions for reflection provided at the end of each chapter. Practical suggestions in the body of the chapters are quite often broken down into numbered lists which can help make them more digestible and easy to fruitfully share, perhaps
in the context of preparation for a meeting.

The discussions of insights from neuroscience and psychology are broadly very helpful for bringing some of the basic biological barriers to fruitful communication into focus. I felt there was something of a compromise involved, though, in trying to bring diverse technical research of this kind in to bolster an essentially practically oriented text; sometimes ideas are touched upon so briefly that it is difficult for the reader to get a clear sense of the true extent of their significance. Of course, Gelinas's references facilitate additional investigation. To me, another limitation of the book is that while it exhorts readers to engage with those different from us, it does not show a great deal of awareness of cultural differences in communication,* which is potentially so important in making that engagement considerate, fair, and fruitful. The real differences in communication styles between cultures probably account for my sense that a degree of adjustment would be needed to import some of Gelinas's advice on handling tensions in meetings to the UK context.

Nevertheless, this book provides such a wealth of insights and suggestions that anyone seeking these in its pages will doubtless be richly rewarded.

* See Donal Carbaugh, Cultures in Communication (Routledge 2010).
The Journal of Dialogue is a multidisciplinary, peer-reviewed academic journal published twice a year. Its aim is to study the theory and practice of dialogue, understood provisionally as a meaningful interaction and exchange between individuals and/or people of different groups (social, cultural, political and religious) who come together through various kinds of conversations or activities with a view to increased understanding. The Editors welcome vigorous discussion and debate on these and other fundamental questions.

The Journal brings together a body of original scholarship on the theory and practice of dialogue that can be critically appraised and debated. It publishes conceptual, research, and/or case-based works on both theory and practice, and papers that discuss wider social, cultural or political issues as these relate to the evaluation of dialogue. In this way, the Journal aims to contribute towards establishing ‘dialogue studies’ as a distinct academic field (or perhaps even emerging discipline). Doing so will be directly useful not only to scholars and students but also to professionals and practitioners working in different contexts at various cultural interfaces.

The particular focus of this volume is ‘Dialogue and Education’. Questions explored include the following:

• How can dialogue be implemented as part of an educational model?
• Where does dialogue stand as a developing discipline-subdiscipline in higher education?
• Are there educational initiatives around the world using curricula inspired by dialogue, and how successful are they?
• Dialogue and education models
• Education and dialogue theories
• What is the role of education in promoting dialogue between different communities?

The Journal is published by the Institute for Dialogue Studies, the academic platform of the Dialogue Society. For further information and instructions for paper submissions, including the Journal Style Guide, please visit www.dialoguestudies.org.